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When Formal Criminality Is Not Enough: what Constitutional Court finding IV. ÚS 455/26 brought to the subsidiarity of criminal repression

by Mgr. Markéta Šimáně
Published:
11. 08. 2026

The finding of the Constitutional Court, Case No. IV. ÚS 455/26, once again reminded that, in the event of the formal fulfilment of the elements of a criminal offence, the use of the instruments of criminal law is not automatically warranted. The core of the decision is the constitutional requirement that criminal courts, in borderline cases, carefully assess the social harmfulness of the act and consider whether other liability under another legal regulation (in particular the instruments of private law) should be contemplated, and why criminal law in particular is necessary for the protection of the infringed or threatened interest. Without this constitutionally compliant approach, there is a risk of the undesirable overuse of criminal law (so-called hypertrophy of criminal repression).

The recent finding of the Constitutional Court, Case No. IV. ÚS 455/26 dated 25 March 2026, declared a breach of the constitutional principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression under Art. 4 par. 4 and Art. 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and quashed the relevant decisions of the general courts challenged by the constitutional complaint. In the previous proceedings under consideration, the criminal courts dealt with the conduct of the complainant during an altercation with the injured party, for which they found the complainant guilty of the criminal offence (felony) of blackmail committed with a weapon (pursuant to the provision of section 175 par. 1, par. 2(c) of the Criminal Code). The complainant was given a sentence of imprisonment for a term of two years, suspended on probation for a probationary period of three years, and also a penalty of expulsion for a period of three years.

The conduct assessed by the criminal courts as the felony of blackmail consisted in the fact that, in August 2024, the complainant in a Prague shop selling cannabis products got into a dispute with the injured party, who, after entering the shop, began filming the interior of the shop, or rather the goods offered there, on her mobile telephone (in her own words, she wanted to make a “funny video”). The complainant, standing behind the counter, immediately objected to this. He asked the injured party to stop filming and leave the shop. However, the injured party did not respond to the complainant’s request and did not stop filming even after the complainant threw a small half-empty bottle of water at her. The complainant then pulled a baseball bat from behind the counter. First, he pushed the injured party with the baseball bat, then he swung the bat (with a demand to leave the shop). As soon as the injured party left the shop premises, the complainant turned back towards the counter; however, the injured party entered the shop again and told the complainant that he was finished there. The complainant reacted by swinging, and the bat struck the door by which the injured party was standing.

The criminal courts disagreed with the complainant’s defence that, by the conduct in question towards the injured party, he was protecting his personal rights, since the injured party was capturing his likeness without his consent. According to the conclusion of the general courts, the injured party was to film only the goods in the shop and not the complainant. The courts further concluded that, in the present case, this was not a case of necessary defence on the part of the complainant, since the injured party captured his face only at the moment when he was brandishing the baseball bat at her. Although the conduct of the injured party was, according to the courts, not ideal (it was even cheeky, arrogant and provocative), the complainant reacted excessively, and even if the injured party had in fact interfered with his personal rights, on the part of the complainant this was a reaction that was manifestly disproportionate. Moreover, the criminal courts counted against the complainant the fact that in the past he had threatened another customer in a similar manner (where that case ended with liability for an offence) and that he was staying in the Czech Republic without a residence permit and therefore did not respect social and legal rules.

The Constitutional Court primarily stated that the criminal courts had formally correctly assessed the complainant’s conduct as the criminal offence of blackmail (section 175 of the Criminal Code), since the complainant compelled the injured party to stop filming the shop, and made that demand with a weapon (a baseball bat), and thus, by a threat of violence, compelled another person to omit something, all this with a weapon. The Constitutional Court also agreed with the criminal courts in their conclusion that, in the present case, this was not a case of necessary defence on the part of the complainant, since the complainant’s conduct was out of keeping with the circumstances of the case and exceeded the limits of what was necessary.

Where, however, the Constitutional Court differs in opinion from the general courts is the question of the degree of social harmfulness of the conduct in question justifying the use of the instruments of criminal law. It emphasised the undesirable situation of so-called hypertrophy of criminal repression, that is, the overuse of criminal law and its application in cases where merely milder legal liability is sufficient, and recalled that, although the current Criminal Code proceeds from a formal concept of a criminal offence, the material corrective in the form of the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression, enshrined in the provision of section 12 par. 2 of the Criminal Code, cannot be overlooked. Criminal liability is thus reserved only for the most serious socially harmful cases, in which the application of liability under another legal regulation is insufficient, and criminal law is therefore the most stringent, last-resort means of protecting interests of significance to society as a whole (the so-called principle of ultima ratio). The principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression then reflects the more general constitutional principle of proportionality within the meaning of Art. 4 par. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

The Constitutional Court inferred that social harmfulness must be examined by criminal courts as part of their constitutional duty, namely in every case where the circumstances indicate negligible or low social harmfulness (point 23 of the finding). In borderline cases, the courts must then carefully consider the application of other liability under another legal regulation. Here the Constitutional Court expressly points to cases arising from private law relations (point 24 of the finding) with a strong private-law basis, because any disputes arising from such relations are resolved precisely by means of private law, and it is therefore constitutionally impermissible for the state, by means of criminal law, to enforce private subjective rights and interests on behalf of individuals. However, the prevailing private-law nature does not, without more, exclude the use of criminal law; everything thus depends on the specific circumstances of the case. In cases where liability for unlawful conduct is completely covered by another legal regulation, the use of criminal law is not warranted. The principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression must be observed at every stage of criminal decision-making.

For the complainant’s case, the Constitutional Court considers it essential that the criminal courts’ argument as to the necessity of punishing the complainant by means of criminal law with regard to his previous similar conduct is unfounded, because the use of criminal law cannot be justified by offence recidivism (save for certain cases). By failing to deal more thoroughly with the social harmfulness of the act, the courts breached the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression. The Constitutional Court concluded that the conduct imputed to the complainant was a private dispute between two persons in which violence was used, but without major consequences; for the broader context, it is also necessary to take into account the conduct of the injured party, who ignored the complainant, repeatedly disregarded his requests and demands, and contributed significantly to the escalation of the whole situation. Lower social harmfulness is also supported by the fact that the complainant did not threaten the injured party with causing harm to health or life, but by his conduct merely sought to achieve that she stop recording a video on her mobile telephone and leave the shop. The complainant’s case was therefore, through the lens of criminal law, a borderline one, and the criminal courts should have approached it accordingly.

The framework delineated by the Constitutional Court is also reflected in the jurisprudential treatment of subsidiarity in the practice of the Supreme Court: the Opinion of the Criminal Division, Case No. Tpjn 301/2012 (R 26/2013 tr.) of 30 January 2013, emphasises that subsidiarity is a principle which must be applied not directly, but in principle only through legal institutes and individual norms of criminal law, and that social harmfulness must be assessed in the particular case under consideration in respect of every less serious criminal offence committed in relation to the criteria set out in the provision of section  39 par. 2 of the Criminal Code.

Finding IV. ÚS 455/26 therefore reinforces the importance of subsidiarity as a real corrective in situations where criminal classification is formally possible, but the substantive reason for criminal liability is weakened by the specific circumstances of the case. For practice, this means increased emphasis on courts sufficiently taking into account, in their decision-making, the particular circumstances diminishing the harmfulness of the act; guidance for this may be found in the provision of section 39 par. 2 of the Criminal Code, where the legislature provides a non-exhaustive list of criteria for assessing the nature and seriousness of the act. This is, however, only an illustrative list, and the individual circumstances of the given case will of course each time carry different weight in the broader context of the conduct in question.

According to Šámal[1] the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression must be considered primarily when assessing the expediency of the criminalisation of new socially harmful conduct, and the principle also acts against efforts to lower the age of criminal liability or to tighten criminal sanctions. The author therefore takes the view that, with regard to today’s technological developments (especially artificial intelligence), the subsidiarity of criminal repression will play a significant role in assessing conduct associated with the use of modern technologies – for example, sextortion, various deepfakes or AI frauds.

In connection with the finding of the Constitutional Court, it is of course also necessary to bear in mind the other side of the coin, which would be represented by the opposite extreme to the overuse of criminal law. One could certainly find cases where, on the contrary, criminal law ought to have been used, but was not, or was used, but with a very lenient result (lenient punishment of the offender). A notorious feature in the domestic environment is the low sentences imposed on perpetrators of criminal offences against human dignity in sexual matters. Cases of gender-based violence may also generally be particularly sensitive. A possible negative impact as a consequence of the finding may lie in the fact that it is not possible to define in advance a borderline case from the perspective of low social harmfulness, which is entirely dependent on the circumstances of the case, and therefore similar conduct may be assessed differently by different judges.

It also remains a question how the general courts will deal with the finding in application practice; however, what is certain is that, for a constitutionally compliant decision, it is not sufficient for the courts merely formally to subsume the act under the relevant facts constituting a criminal offence (statutory elements of a crime), but they must transparently and consistently take into account the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression with regard to the specific circumstances of the case and reflect this in the reasoning of their decision.

[1] ŠÁMAL, Pavel. The subsidiarity of criminal repression in relation to individual facts constituting criminal offences in the Criminal Code. Criminal Law Review, 2010, No. 5, pp. 133-140.

Source: epravo.cz

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