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Interpretation of certain issues concerning general meetings of commercial corporations in the light of current case law

by JUDr. Petr Pivko
Published:
14. 09. 2026

The general meeting constitutes the supreme body of capital commercial corporations, through which associates, or shareholders, exercise their right to participate in the management of the company. Although the legal regulation of the general meeting in the Business Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as the “BCA”) is relatively detailed, with the growing number of disputes between associates it is becoming apparent that a whole range of practical issues remains without an unequivocal answer. For example, may an associate of a limited liability company raise a counterproposal at the general meeting when the law does not expressly provide for this? To what extent may the adopted resolution of the general meeting differ from the proposal set out in the invitation? Will the preclusive period for asserting an associate’s right to information begin to run if the company simply does not respond to the associate’s request? And does the company fulfil its obligation to draw up minutes of the general meeting by sending the shareholder an unsigned electronic file without annexes?

The Supreme Court answered these and other questions in a trio of decisions from the first half of 2026, to which this article is devoted. All three decisions are connected by the fact that they address situations not previously dealt with in case law, or alternatively correct the conclusions of the lower courts, which in its view applied older case law incorrectly. The result is a set of conclusions with an immediate impact on the functioning of limited liability companies as well as joint-stock companies – from the preparation of the invitation to the general meeting, through the course of its proceedings, to the proper preparation of the minutes and the protection of the rights of members and third parties.

Interpretation of the term “matter stated in the invitation”, the admissibility of a counterproposal and the protection of the good faith of third parties within a limited liability company

Supreme Court ruling dated 28 May 2026, Case No. 27 Cdo 306/2025

The first decision discussed here is rich in legal issues not previously resolved. In it, the Supreme Court commented on three interrelated aspects: (i) how broadly the term “matter stated in the invitation” to the general meeting of an LLC is to be interpreted within the meaning of Section 185 of the BCA, (ii) whether an associate of a limited liability company may put forward counterproposals to a proposed resolution even though the law does not expressly regulate this, and (iii) what role is played by the protection of the good faith of third parties when the court decides on the invalidity of a resolution of the general meeting (Section 260 par. 2 of the Civil Code).

An associate of a limited liability company sought a declaration of invalidity of a resolution of the general meeting by which the transfer of the shares of two members (each amounting to 25%) to a third associate was approved. The invitation to the general meeting stated as an item on the agenda “approval of the transfer of the shares of associates to a third person”. During the general meeting, however, one of the associates exercised, in relation to the shares being transferred, a pre-emptive right regulated by the memorandum of association and proposed that the shares be transferred not to a third person, but to him. The general meeting approved this proposal by three votes out of four. The applicant (the fourth associate) objected on the grounds that the invitation did not mention a transfer to another associate. The courts of both instances declared the resolution invalid, both because the general meeting had decided on a matter not stated in the invitation and also because the member had not formally designated his proposal as a counterproposal and because, in their opinion, members of a LLC are not entitled to submit counterproposals, since the law does not expressly regulate them for a LLC. The lower courts refused to apply section 260 par. 2 of the Civil Code (protection of the good faith of third parties) on the ground that the third person to whom the share was to be transferred had not acquired any right in connection with the challenged resolution and moreover could not have been in good faith, because the applicant’s pre-emptive right to the shares of the other associates was entered in the Commercial Register. The Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the lower courts.

On the interpretation of the matter stated in the invitation

Under section 184 par. 1 of the BCA, the associates of a limited liability company must be notified in writing of the place, date and time of the general meeting and of its agenda at least 15 days before the date on which it is held, and the invitation must also include a proposed resolution of the general meeting. Section 185 of the BCA then provides that matters not stated in the invitation may be discussed only if all associates are present and consent to their discussion.

In practice, however, the question arises as to how broadly or narrowly the term “matter stated in the invitation” is to be interpreted, that is, whether the subsequently adopted resolution must correspond to the literal wording of the agenda, or whether it is sufficient that it remains within the thematic framework of the given agenda item.

The Supreme Court interpreted the agenda described in the invitation as defining the thematic scope of the general meeting. Associates should not be taken by surprise by the discussion of matters in respect of which they had no reason to believe that the general meeting would address them. At the same time, however, it remains true that the resulting resolution may differ from the proposed resolution. What is essential is that it falls within the matter stated on the agenda.

According to the Supreme Court, the invitation to the general meeting is a legal act attributable to the company, addressed to the associates, and the rules of the Civil Code regarding the interpretation of legal acts apply to its interpretation. When interpreting the content of the invitation, it is necessary to have regard to the intention of the person acting (the company represented by the convener), which was or must have been known to the associates, and if such intention cannot be ascertained, to attribute to it the meaning that would ordinarily be attached to it by a person in the position of an associate of the company concerned.

In the specific case, the Supreme Court inferred that even a decision consenting to the transfer of a share to another associate may fall within an agenda item defined as “approval of the transfer of shares to a third person”, if the members had agreed a pre-emptive right in the memorandum of association, negotiations concerning the identity of the transferee had taken place and were known to all members, and they could rationally have anticipated that the announced change of ownership structure might ultimately take a different form.

The Supreme Court thus formulated a key rule: a decision which a member may rationally anticipate within the framework of the given agenda item will, as a rule, fall within the matter stated in the invitation within the meaning of section 185 of the BCA, and the general meeting may adopt it without the conditions of that provision being satisfied.

On the admissibility of a counterproposal in a limited liability company

Closely related to the interpretation of the term “matter stated in the invitation” is the second issue resolved in the same decision, namely whether an associate of a limited liability company may at all put forward counterproposals to the proposed resolution set out in the invitation, and if so, what their legal regime is. The Business Corporations Act expressly regulates the right to put forward counterproposals only for shareholders of a joint-stock company (section 361 of the BCA). For a limited liability company, a similar express rule is absent, which in practice had given rise to uncertainty regarding the very existence of that right and any formal requirements attaching to it.

The Supreme Court expressly confirmed that the right of associates of a limited liability company to participate in the management of the company (section 167 par. 1 of the BCA) also entails the right to express their view as to what resolution the general meeting should adopt, and thus to influence the final form of the resolution. This purpose is served, inter alia, by the right, not expressly regulated by law, to put forward a counterproposal.

At the same time, the Supreme Court emphasised that the mixed nature of a limited liability company (containing elements of both capital companies and personal companies) does not permit the rules governing the same institution in a joint-stock company to be adopted automatically without more. The formalised rules for counterproposals in a joint-stock company are based on the assumption of a larger number of members, which is not true for the overwhelming majority of limited liability companies.

Unless the memorandum of association provides otherwise, a member may put forward a counterproposal both before the sitting of the general meeting and directly at its sitting. A counterproposal is a unilateral legal act of the associate addressed to the company and must be interpreted according to the rules for the interpretation of legal acts – according to its content, not its designation, and according to the intention of the person acting, which was or must have been known to the other party.

In the matter under consideration, the Supreme Court therefore concluded that where, at the sitting of the general meeting, an associate exercised his pre-emptive right and stated that he wished the interests of other members to be transferred to him, such manifestation of intention could be regarded as a counterproposal – regardless of the fact that the member did not formally designate it as a counterproposal and that it was not so designated in the minutes of the general meeting either.

On the protection of the good faith of third parties in the event of the invalidity of a resolution of the general meeting

Finally, in the same decision the Supreme Court also considered the application of section 260 par. 2 of the Civil Code, according to which the court will not declare the decision of a corporate body invalid if this would substantially interfere with the right of a third person acquired in good faith.

The lower courts refused to apply section 260 par. 2 of the Civil Code on two grounds: first, that the third person (the intended transferee of the shares) had not acquired a right directly in connection with the challenged resolution, and secondly, that it could not have been in good faith, because the applicant’s pre-emptive right to the shares of the other associates was entered in the Commercial Register.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. In its view, the protection of the rights of third parties acquired in good faith cannot be limited only to the immediate consequences of the challenged resolution of the general meeting or only to rights acquired within a certain period of time. Interference with the rights of third parties does not need necessarily to be linked to the resolution the invalidity of which the court is deciding upon. The only relevant consideration is whether a declaration of invalidity would in fact negatively and substantially interfere with the rights of third parties. A mere potential possibility of such interference is not sufficient.

As to the issue of good faith, the Supreme Court stated an important conclusion: the mere existence of a pre-emptive right in respect of a share (regardless of whether it is a right in rem or merely an obligatory right) does not in any way cast doubt on the entitlement of the associate and owner of the share to transfer the share to a third person. The entry of the pre-emptive right in the Commercial Register therefore cannot displace the good faith of the transferee of the share in the transferor’s entitlement to transfer that interest.

Commencement of the running of the preclusive period for bringing an action for the provision of information at the general meeting of a limited liability company

Supreme Court judgment dated 4 June 2026, Case No. 27 Cdo 621/2025

In a further decision, the Supreme Court addressed a dispute between an associate and the company which arose following the refusal (or silencing) regarding a request for the provision of information, and the conclusions reached are fundamental for the position of associates, as they prevent the company from achieving, by merely ignoring a request for information, the preclusion of the associate’s right to seek information through the courts. On the facts, an associate holding a 49% interest in a limited liability company requested, by letter dated 14 January 2020, that the managing directors provide specified information and produce certain documents, for which he set a time limit until 14 February 2020. The defendant company responded to the request by email dated 17 February 2020, in which it promised that it would provide the information as part of the preparations for a general meeting which it intended to convene. Ultimately, after longer communication, a meeting took place between the parties on 8 September 2020, at which the company provided the associate with only partial documents and stated that it would provide him with no further information, without giving any reasons for the refusal whatsoever. The associate requesting information subsequently brought an action under section 156 par. 2 of the BCA. The court of the first instance partially upheld the action, while the appellate court dismissed the action on the ground that the one-month preclusive period had begun to run upon the expiry without result of the time limit set by the associate, that is, on 14 February 2020, and had expired on 16 March 2020, thus even before the action was brought. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the appellate court.

Under section 155 of the BCA, a member has the right to request information about the company from the managing directors, to inspect the company’s documents and to check the data contained therein. Section 156 par. 2 of the BCA then provides for a one-month preclusive period for bringing an action, calculated from the date of the notification of the refusal to provide information. However, the law does not expressly address the situation where the company does not respond to the associate’s request at all. This gives rise to the fundamental question whether and when the preclusive period begins to run in the event of the company’s inaction, or, more specifically, whether the mere expiry without result of the period stipulated by the associate in the request constitutes a refusal within the meaning of the law. In this respect, the Supreme Court did not overlook that the very regulation of the preclusive period in section 156 par. 2 of the BCA has been criticised in legal literature as unsystematic and problematic.

The Supreme Court adopted several fundamental conclusions. First, the company’s notification of refusal to provide information is an addressed legal act of the company towards the requesting associate. It must be a definite and intelligible manifestation of intention attributable to the company, which enters the associate’s sphere of disposition and is subject to interpretation according to the rules of section 555 et seq. of the Civil Code. Regardless of its form (which is not regulated by law), it must always be an active manifestation of intention, not mere inaction. Secondly, the mere fact that the company does not express itself in any way in response to the associate’s request does not constitute a refusal of information from which the preclusive period would begin to run. Mere silence cannot, without more, be regarded as a manifestation of intention. This applies even where the requesting associate stipulates in the request a time limit for the provision of information. In addition, the moment when the company was obliged under the associate’s request to provide the information is legally irrelevant for the commencement of the running of the preclusive period. Thirdly, in the event of the company’s silence, that is, the absence of any response whatsoever to the associate’s request, the associate may bring an action under section 156 par. 2 of the BCA regardless of the fact that the preclusive period has not yet begun to run for him. The member is therefore not obliged to wait for an express refusal, nor is he compelled to bring precautionary actions in a situation where the company is communicating with him and promises to provide the information. Fourthly, the regulation of the preclusive period in section 156 par. 2 of the BCA is dispositive; the associates may set different rules in the memorandum of association, including extending or completely excluding the preclusive period.

Requisites of the minutes of the general meeting of a joint-stock company and the shareholder’s right to a copy thereof

Supreme Court judgment dated 24 June 2026, Case No. 27 Cdo 3018/2025

In the last decision discussed here, the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a shareholder holding a 10% share in the registered capital of a joint-stock company sought an order requiring the company to prepare minutes of the general meeting and send him a copy thereof. At the general meeting, the members of the bodies of the general meeting had been duly elected (chair, minute-taker and verifiers of the minutes). The company sent the shareholder by e-mail a file in the text editor Microsoft Word labelled as minutes of the general meeting “for confirmation, or comments as the case may be”. This file was not signed by anyone and contained no annexes. Subsequently, a debate arose among the shareholders regarding the final form of the minutes. The shareholder pointed out that the proposed changes did not correspond to what had actually taken place at the general meeting, and preferred finalisation of the minutes with the elected minute-taker. However, no agreement was reached and the shareholder requested that a copy of the proper minutes be sent to him. He subsequently enforced this right by an action for performance before the court. The courts of both instances dismissed the action on the grounds that the company had fulfilled its obligation by sending the aforementioned Word file, since even minutes without signatures are still minutes of the general meeting, and that it was for the shareholder to print the file himself. The Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the lower courts.

Under section 423 of the BCA, the minute-taker shall prepare minutes of the general meeting within 15 days from the date of its conclusion. The minutes shall bear the signature of the minute-taker, the chair of the general meeting or the convener, and the verifier of the minutes. The law also lays down the content requirements of the minutes and specifies the annexes to be attached to the minutes (submitted proposals, statements and the attendance list). Under section 425 of the BCA, a shareholder may request the statutory body to issue a copy of the minutes, throughout the entire duration of the company's existence.

In the case law of the Supreme Court, it had previously been inferred that defects in the minutes (including the absence of signatures) do not in themselves cause the invalidity of a resolution of the general meeting. In the present case, the lower courts unduly extended that conclusion to proceedings for the imposition of an obligation to prepare the minutes and send a copy thereof, thereby in effect concluding that any document labelled by the company as minutes is sufficient to satisfy the statutory obligation.

However, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the transfer of case law concerning the effect of defects in the minutes on the validity of resolutions of the general meeting to proceedings concerning fulfilment of the obligation to prepare the minutes and send a copy thereof to the shareholder. In proceedings for a declaration of invalidity of a resolution, the minutes perform only an evidential function, and there is therefore no reason for defects therein to affect the validity of the resolution. By contrast, in proceedings for the imposition of an obligation to prepare the minutes, this concerns an action for performance, the quality of which (content requirements) is laid down directly by law. In such proceedings, defects in the minutes cannot be disregarded as insignificant. The persons referred to in section 423 par. 1 of the BCA confirm by their signatures that the contents of the minutes correspond to the actual course of the general meeting. It is precisely these persons (elected by the shareholders) who prepare the minutes, sign them and bear responsibility for their contents. In proceedings for the imposition of an obligation to prepare the minutes, it is therefore irrelevant what document the statutory body of the company designated as minutes of the general meeting; the shareholder is entitled to a copy of the minutes which satisfy the statutory content requirements and are signed by the relevant persons.

At the same time, the Supreme Court confirmed that the shareholder’s right to issue a copy of the minutes without limitation as to its scope includes the right to a complete copy including all annexes. Sending an unsigned freely editable electronic file containing no annexes, albeit labelled as minutes of the general meeting, does not fulfil the company’s obligation. The objection of excessive formalism, relied upon by the court of the first instance, was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, since the law clearly prescribes what requirements the minutes must satisfy, and the company will duly fulfil its obligation only by preparing minutes containing those requirements.

Conclusion

The presented trio of Supreme Court decisions provides answers to questions which have not yet been addressed in judicial practice and which have a direct practical impact on the functioning of general meetings of commercial corporations. Particularly groundbreaking may be considered the court ruling, Case No. 27 Cdo 306/2025, which, within a single decision, for the first time expressly confirmed the right of an associate of a limited liability company to submit counterproposals, defined the boundaries for interpretation of the agenda of the general meeting, and reminded the courts that the protection of good faith of third parties cannot be reduced merely to the immediate consequences of the challenged resolution. No less practically important is the judgment, Case No. 27 Cdo 621/2025, the conclusion of which, namely that the mere silence of the company does not trigger the preclusive period for the exercise of information rights, protects associates from a situation in which the company could, by mere inactivity, bring about the extinction of their right to seek information through the courts. Finally, the judgment, Case No. 27 Cdo 3018/2025, brings much-needed clarity to the distinction between the evidential function of the minutes and their function as the subject of performance, thereby sending companies a clear signal that the obligation to prepare minutes cannot be discharged by sending an informal and incomplete document.

The common denominator of all three decisions is an emphasis on the teleological interpretation of the law, rejection of excessive formalism where it would prejudice the rights of associates, and, conversely, insistence on compliance with statutory requirements where the law expressly requires it. For practice, a clear conclusion follows from them: the general meeting is not merely a formal ritual, but a living mechanism of company governance, the rules of which must be interpreted so that they genuinely serve their purpose, namely to enable members to participate in the management of their company in an informed and effective manner.

Source: epravo.cz

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